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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Once the breadbasket of Southern Africa, Zimbabwe has undergone a radical 
transformation presently characterized by ever increasing rates of HIV and AIDS, low 
population growth, acute food shortages, radically decreasing life expectancy, 
hyperinflation, and insecurity of life and property.  Additionally, the growing brutality of 
political and electoral oppression has engendered significant domestic, regional, and 
international condemnation of the Zimbabwean government.  News media, human rights 
organizations, and foreign governments have all voiced their concern for the rapid 
deterioration of Zimbabwe.   
This thesis analyzes the course of Zimbabwe’s economic, political, and social 
decline between its independence in 1980 and 2005.  While popular interpretations place 
blame predominantly upon President Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African Union-
Patriotic Front, this thesis offers a more nuanced explanation for Zimbabwe’s current 
crisis.  This view contends that the structural adjustment policies of the Bretton Woods 
institutions, in concert with the breakdown of democratic institutions and the 
implementation of radical land reform policies led to Zimbabwe’s current economic, 
political, and social decline.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHICAL 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Zimbabwe achieved independence from white minority rule in 1980 after a hard-
fought liberation struggle. However, the challenges for the newly independent state were 
many. The Zimbabwean economy was still dominated by the minority white commercial 
farmers who numbered about four thousand, but controlled one-third of the land. The 
black population, on the other hand, was relegated to areas that had poor soil, inadequate 
rainfall and weak infrastructure. Consequently, the options for the black population were 
limited to working on white farms for low wages. The Mugabe government, which came 
to power in 1980 with a radical socialist agenda, was faced with a dilemma. The 
economy was driven largely by the export-oriented large tobacco and maize farms of 
white-owned commercial farms.   Additionally, white farmers also produced a broad 
range of crops for the domestic market. This settler-dominated economic system had to 
be balanced against a broad range of conflicting interests in Zimbabwe’s black 
population, the most important one being land redistribution. 
Throughout the first decade of independence, Robert Mugabe adopted a gradual 
approach to this controversial issue. This policy was shaped by two important factors. 
First, Zimbabwe’s economy at independence was relatively prosperous and there was the 
real danger that radical reforms could jeopardize economic stability. Second, prior to 
1990, the government was constrained by the stipulations of the Lancaster Accords which 
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prohibited seizing white farms without compensation. In spite of these constraints, the 
government made great strides in improving the living conditions of the majority black 
population and also providing skilled Africans opportunities in the white-dominated 
private sector. 
In the past fifteen years, however, Zimbabwe’s economy has experienced a 
significant downward spiral. This has led to two important developments. First, the 
Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has abandoned its gradual policy 
of land redistribution in favor of a radical, Fast-Track approach. Second, there has been a 
dramatic shift from Mugabe’s socialist ideology to a policy of economic liberalization.  
In addition to economic destabilization, corrupt policies favoring colonial institutions and 
severe governmental mismanagement have eroded Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions.  
One-partyism, electoral fraud, intimidation tactics, and complete disregard for judicial 
authority and human rights have left Mugabe and ZANU-PF isolated from international 
support and facing intense opposition from civil society organizations.   
A majority of the interpretations of Zimbabwe’s economic, political, and social 
decline place the blame primarily on either the Zimbabwean government or the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund’s Economic Structural Adjustment Policy 
(ESAP). This thesis goes beyond the conventional scholarship of the past three decades to 
offer a more nuanced analysis of Zimbabwe’s current economic, political, and social 
crisis and argues that the Fast-Track land reforms instituted in February 2000 are the 
culmination of structural and institutional deficiencies that have existed in Zimbabwe 
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since before independence. These reforms, which have been hurriedly orchestrated, are 
the results of the failure of ZANU-PF to properly resolve the weaknesses of the 
Zimbabwean economy at independence. They are also attempts at creating political 
legitimacy in the face of rising social disillusionment, spirited political opposition by 
Morgan Tsvangirai and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and economic 
paralysis engendered by the liberalization policies of the World Bank and IMF. 
 
 
Historiographical Analysis 
 
Post-independence Zimbabwean studies have undergone multiple transformations 
in the three decades following the transfer to majority rule.  Since 1980, the literature has 
been divided into three primary phases:  the transition to majority rule and the 
consolidation of power, democratization, and the rise of authoritarianism.  Each phase is 
indicative of scholarly opinion of Zimbabwe and its leadership; specifically regarding the 
hope and promise of a racially harmonious and democratically constructed state.   
Studies conducted during the transition period (1980-1988) were conceived in a 
sweeping wave of euphoria and international goodwill.  As a result, scholars were often 
moderate in their criticisms; maintaining a reserved optimism and focusing primarily on 
the integration of old guard Zimbabwean Nationalists into the new majority government, 
Mugabe’s Socialist rhetoric and its potential conflicts with private capital, and the shift 
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from radical guerilla warfare to democratic governance.  Additionally, limited knowledge 
resulted in only superficial scrutiny of ZANU-PF’s shortcomings, notably economic 
development and human rights policies, during what Martin Meredith calls the 
Zimbabwean “Honeymoon” period of 1980-1981.1  In the words of historian Terence 
Ranger, “Any attempt to assess at this moment the prospects for radical change in 
Zimbabwe confronts a crippling imbalance of knowledge.”2
Throughout the 1980s, the continued repression of civil liberties and violent 
government reactions to opposition supporters were becoming commonplace.  Still, these 
events were either completely ignored by Western scholars, or rationalized as after 
effects of Zimbabwe’s repressive colonial legacy and the need for strong government 
intervention to assure regional stability.
 
3  Recent literature interprets the absence of 
watchdogs within the academic community as a form of self-censorship.  Many believed 
that drawing attention to human rights violations would only exacerbate already virulent 
tensions in the region, and limited scrutiny constituted an assurance of continued stability 
in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa.4
However, by the early 1990s, the optimism of the first decade of independence 
had dissipated at the hands of mounting economic concerns and growing 
     
                                                 
1 Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder, 41-57. 
2 Terence Ranger, “The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the revival of ZANU,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 7, no. 1 (October 1980), 71. 
3 Ronald Weitzer, “In Search of Regime Security: Zimbabwe Since Independence,” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies 22, no. 4 (1984): 529-557. 
4 Liisa Laakso, “Research Debates in Zimbabwe: From Analysis to Practice,” in Twenty Years of 
Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism, eds. Staffan Darnolf and Liisa Laakso 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 4. 
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authoritarianism.  Consequently, scholarly interpretations of Zimbabwe assumed a much 
more historical approach based on empirical data.  Revisionist literature began to 
challenge the existing nationalist narrative of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.  Also, the 
incorporation of gender studies allowed for the inclusion of previously unheard voices of 
the liberation struggle.  More than anything, this period saw a transformation in the 
academic community’s perception of Zimbabwe from a possible beacon of democracy 
and racial tolerance in Southern Africa to an increasingly pragmatic and interest-based 
state, particularly with regards to economic liberalization and privatization.5
With a decade of governance to analyze, researchers began to probe deeper into 
Zimbabwe’s political process, stressing the need for multi-party politics and criticizing 
the one-party state that had existed since the merger of ZANU-PF and ZAPU-PF in 1987.  
Transition-era literature had created a façade of pragmatism, reconciliation, and relative 
governmental strength steeped in socialist ideals.  Initially, Zimbabwe was seen as a 
hybrid state, a combination of neopatrimonialism and competitive multi-party politics.
     
6
Criticism stemmed from two primary factors.  First, the growth of multi-party 
states throughout Eastern Europe and the rest of Africa raised significant questions about 
the democratic legitimacy of Zimbabwe’s one-party system.  Second, the liberalization of 
  
However, beginning in the late 1980s scholars began to question both Zimbabwe’s 
governmental stability and its legitimacy as a Socialist state.   
                                                 
5 Ibid., 5. 
6 Bratton, Michael and Nicholas Van De Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 79, 82. 
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the economy along the model pushed by the World Bank and IMF signaled an end of the 
Socialist revolution at the heart of Zimbabwe’s independence movement.  Institution of 
the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1991 significantly damaged the 
reputation and authority of Mugabe and ZANU-PF due to their inability to rely on the 
rhetoric of the previous decade.7
“[S]cholars recognized that the revolutionary zeal that had characterized ZANU-
PF’s liberation struggle had dissipated after independence.  A common theme pervading 
these analyses is the notion, steeped in dependency theory, which views the ruling elites 
as too weak and reliant on foreign capital.  As such they were merely a neo-colonial 
governing African petit-bourgeoisie pliantly serving the goals of their colonial masters.”
   
Structural adjustment caused many to question the advantages of economic 
liberalization on Zimbabwe’s economic standing.  According to Jørn Rattsø and Ragnar 
Torvik, the advantages of trade liberalization affected only the export of raw materials 
(minerals, agricultural produce, and horticulture) instead of manufactured goods.  This 
dependency model stressed what most researchers have held true for the past decade of 
Zimbabwean studies; that the ESAP instituted in cooperation with the World Bank and 
IMF has significantly disrupted and retarded the growth and diversification of 
Zimbabwe’s economy by placing greater emphasis on the privatization of industry and 
incorporation into the world market.  According to Alfred Nhema:  
 
8
                                                 
7 Laakso, 9.   
8 Alfred Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Liberalization (Harare: University of 
Zimbabwe Press, 2002), 107. 
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In addition to its economic stability, the democratic institutions in Zimbabwe 
were also called into question.  Scholars like Masipula Sithole analyzed the shift from a 
nation and government born in guerilla warfare to a centralized state fearful of opposition 
and political instability.9  Since the mid 1980s, various Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) had been reporting of human rights violations perpetrated under governmental 
authority.  Notably, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP) and the Legal 
Resources Foundation’s (LRF) report on atrocities in the Matabeleland and Midlands 
provinces between 1980 and 1988 was instrumental in increased international pressure on 
the Zimbabwean government for the preservation of multi-party democracy and human 
rights.10
By the mid-to-late 1990s, response to the CCJP/LRF report, declining economic 
stability, and new international pressure spearheaded by Great Britain, Zimbabwean civil 
society, and international lenders resulted in widespread criticism of ZANU-PF and 
Robert Mugabe. As a result, Zimbabwean studies underwent yet another thematic 
transformation focused on the state’s growing authoritarianism and socio-economic crisis 
that has since divided the academic community.  Beginning in the mid-1990s, a number 
of books, including Martin Meredith’s Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for 
Zimbabwe and Stephen Chan’s Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence, have 
established corrupt governance by Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF as the primary causes 
   
                                                 
9 Masipula Sithole, Democracy and the One-Party State Debate in Africa: The Case of Zimbabwe (Harare: 
Sapes Books, 1992). 
10 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence, 
Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988 
(Harare: Legal Resources Foundation Legal Publications Unit, 1999). 
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in Zimbabwe’s economic and social collapse.  However, there are those who question 
such a simplistic analysis, and instead interpret Mugabe’s policies within a broader 
international context.  John L. Moore posits that the Western interpretation of the crisis is 
misguided and myopic, and that the effects of the World Bank and IMF structural 
adjustment policies are primarily responsible for the deterioration of Zimbabwe’s 
economy and social stability.11
“[S]tructural adjustment did work: it closes a brief historical chapter when 
political independence partially disrupted the dependent economic linkage 
between the countries of Africa and the core creditor states of global capitalism.  
It did work because it represents a conjuncture where holders of international 
money and those of domestic political power were reunited and consolidated in 
the governance structures of the indebted states.”
  
Structural adjustment as an institution has come under fire in recent debates about 
the validity of economic liberalization in developing nations.  Those like Sarah Bracking 
claim that while unnecessary:  
 
12
However, scholars like Moore, L. M. Sachikonye
 
 
13 and William Brown14
                                                 
11 Moore, Zimbabwe’s Fight to the Finish.   
12 Sarah Bracking, “Structural Adjustment: Why It Wasn’t Necessary & Why It Did Work,” Review of 
African Political Economy 26, no. 80 (June 1999), 208. 
13 L. M. Sachikonye, “Zimbabwe: Drought, Food, and Adjustment,” Review of African Political 
Economy , no. 53 (March 1992), 92. 
14 William Brown, “The EU & Structural Adjustment: The Case of Lomé IV & Zimbabwe,” Review of 
African Political Economy 26, no. 79 (March 1999),  
 severely 
question the effectiveness of structural adjustment and criticize oversight on the part of 
Bretton Woods institutions, the EU, and other Western lenders in the disbursement of 
needed economic stimulus in the early 1990s.   
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 Beyond structural adjustment, recent scholarship has branched off to study the 
various actors in Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis, their contemporary relevance, and how the 
past three decades have altered their roles within society and government.  Alfred 
Nhema’s book titled Democracy in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Liberalization 
emphasizes the impact of civil society groups (business interests, labor, women’s 
movements, professional associations, social and religious organizations, and the media) 
on the power and authority of the Zimbabwean government.  Nhema maintains that the 
decision by the post-independence Zimbabwean government to maintain aspects of the 
exclusionary UDI framework to forward their explicit goal of a one-party state caused 
clashes with civil society organizations who were attempting to cement their own 
authority as watchdogs.   
Perhaps the most important of these civil society groups are the war veterans of 
the Second Chimurenga.  The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 
(ZNLWVA) became an instrumental force in pressuring Mugabe and ZANU-PF in 
allocating compensation for veterans and their families.  As a result of their 1997 
demonstrations, the Mugabe regime was thoroughly shaken and forced to pay a 
significant lump sum  (Z$ 50,000), monthly pensions (Z$ 2,000), free education, and 
reevaluate its land redistribution policies.15
                                                 
15 Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe, 144. 
  After the failed constitutional referendum 
three years later, war veterans’ direct involvement in precipitating and enacting the land 
seizures of 2000 caused scholars to begin dissecting the material and ideological 
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motivations of this group as well as their relationship with the Zimbabwean government.  
Norma Krieger’s chapter titled “Zimbabwe’s War Veterans and the Ruling Party: 
Continuities in Political Dynamics” analyzes this relationship in detail.  Specifically, she 
notes the failures of ZANU-PF in providing adequate compensation for liberation fighters 
and the ability of these individuals to challenge state power through a united front.16  
Jocelyn Alexander reiterates this claim.  She emphasizes the economic hardships 
throughout the early-to-mid 1990s as a primary reason for the rise in veteran movements 
against the government.17
While most scholars argue that literature concerning Zimbabwe is divided into 
three distinct periods: the transition to majority rule and the consolidation of power, 
  
 Building on her studies of the war veteran movement, Alexander has also 
contributed one of the seminal works on Zimbabwe’s relationship to its land and the 
government’s use of the issue for appeasement and mass mobilization.  The Unsettled 
Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003 explores the multi-
faceted impetus of the war veteran-spurred land seizures through a mix of historical 
analysis and contemporary case studies.  Alexander effectively shows how shifting policy 
dynamics in the wake of structural adjustment have caused land to be the primary 
political currency in the failing Mugabe regime.   
                                                 
16 Norma Krieger, “Zimbabwe’s War Veterans and the Ruling Party: Continuities in Political Dynamics,” 
in Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism eds. Staffan Darnold 
and Liisa Laakso (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 
17 Jocelyn Alexander, “’Squaters’, Veterans and the State in Zimbabwe,” in Zimbabwe’s Unfinished 
Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis,  eds. Amanda Hammar, Brian 
Raftopoulos, and Stig Jensen (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003),  
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democratization, and the rise of authoritarianism, I maintain that recent events demand a 
fourth installment into the nation’s historiography.  Following the failed constitutional 
referendum of 2000 and the subsequent land seizures by “war veterans,” new dynamics 
emerged which have further exacerbated the already virulent tensions brewing from the 
previous decade.  The current “crisis literature” that had emerged is reflective of 
increased scholarly interest and criticism.  In Jocelyn Alexander’s words: 
 
“It suddenly seem[s] possible to write about politics in Zimbabwe, and specifically about 
land, without reference to the high modernism or customary projects of previous decades.  
Analysis [has] shifted to a focus on the partisan violence of veterans, youth militias and 
security forces, to ZANU-PF’s manipulations of nationalist history, and the struggles of 
civic organizations, trade unions and the political opposition...Zimbabwe seemed to be 
entering the world described by political scientists of Africa elsewhere – the ‘politics of 
disorder’, the ‘politics of the belly’.”18
My own thesis falls squarely within the realm of crisis literature.  I contend that 
fundamental structural problems within the state that have existed since before 
independence have resulted in the limited economic sovereignty and collapse of 
Zimbabwe.  This poor governance, rooted in the shortsighted economic policies and 
ideological goals of a one-party state, created an environment which exacerbated the 
structural adjustment policies pushed by the Bretton Woods institutions.  Additionally, 
the rise of civil society in the form of trade unions, human rights organizations, and 
multi-national advocacy groups placed further stress on an already limited toleration of 
opposition by the Zimbabwean government.   
 
 
                                                 
18 Jocelyn Alexander, The Unsettled Land: State-Making & the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006), 180. 
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The following chapters analyze the course of post-independence Zimbabwe from 
its roots in Marxist-Leninist ideology through its decline as result of economic 
liberalization, governmental mismanagement, rampant corruption, and the failure of 
democratic institutions.  Chapter two analyzes the historical background of Zimbabwe’s 
current crisis.  Beginning with the unchecked wave of European colonialism in the late 
nineteenth century, it discusses the British push into Southern Africa, the subsequent 
subjugation of native populations, and the issue of land in the colonial context. 
Additionally, it chronicles the rise of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia and the racial 
impetus for the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965.  Finally, chapter two 
analyzes the rise of Robert Mugabe to national and international prominence during 
Zimbabwe’s liberation war and transition to majority rule.    
Chapter three analyzes the first decade of independence, spanning from the 
Lancaster House Agreements to the beginnings of land redistribution and the onset of 
economic liberalization.  Specifically, it focuses on ZANU-PF’s attempts to cultivate a 
Socialist state through one-partyism and Mugabe’s penchant for violent repression of 
opposition forces.  Finally, chapter three will highlight the evolving role of civil society 
organizations and their often contentious relationship with the Mugabe government.  
Chapter four analyzes the domestic and international factors that contributed to 
the economic, political, and social decline of Zimbabwe in the second decade of 
independence.  Beginning with structural adjustment and economic liberalization by the 
World Bank and IMF, this chapter discusses the tumultuous relationship between Robert 
13 
 
Mugabe and the West. In addition, chapter four analyzes the economic and political 
destabilization of Zimbabwe through military intervention in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, rising tensions between the government and civil society organizations, 
dissension by war veteran groups, and the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change.     
Finally, the aforementioned factors are shown to cause the breakdown of democratic 
institutions and necessitate the implementation of Fast-Track land resettlement for the 
sake of political expediency.   
Chapter five analyzes the aftermath of Fast-Track land reform and the continued 
deterioration of Zimbabwe’s political, economic, and social stability.  Specifically, it 
details the devastation wrought by Mugabe’s attempts to quell opposition support through 
violence, intimidation, and electoral fraud in the 2002 presidential elections and 2005 
House of Assembly elections.  In addition, this chapter discusses Operation 
Murambatsvina, during which Mugabe ordered the clearing of city centers under the 
pretense of urban renewal, leaving hundreds of thousands homeless and drawing the 
condemnation of the international community.   Finally, chapter five places Zimbabwe’s 
current crisis in the larger historical context and draws correlations between recent events 
and themes prevalent throughout Africa’s colonial and post-colonial history.   
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CHAPTER TWO: ZIMBABWE BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
In order to properly understand the historical context land reform, it is necessary 
to first explore the colonial period in Southern Africa.  By understanding Zimbabwe’s 
early colonial legacy, and later the nationalist struggle for independence which 
culminated in the Second Chimurenga, the importance of land in Zimbabwean society 
will have greater clarity in the post-colonial context.  Additionally, causes of Zimbabwe’s 
political, economic, and social paralysis will begin to take on a broader focus to include 
international economic interests. 
 
 
European Colonization, 1885-1900 
 
By the 1880s, European incursions into Africa began to escalate into a scramble 
for territory aimed at expanding traditional spheres of influence.  At the urging of 
Portugal, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck called an international conference in 
Berlin to which he invited representatives from the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, 
Portugal, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France, Denmark, Russia, Italy, Sweden-
Norway, the Ottoman Empire, and the United States.  From November 1884 to February 
1885, the Berlin Conference established rules for the colonization of Africa by European 
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powers.  Consequently, Africa was partitioned into regions, or spheres, dominated by 
Germany, France, Great Britain, and Portugal.  France gained control of the majority of 
West Africa, Belgium maintained their control of Central Africa, the British East and 
South Africa, Portugal gained small areas in West and South Africa, and Germany 
controlled areas in all four geographical regions.    
British incursions into Southern Africa began almost a decade before with their 
annexation of the South African Republic (ZAR) in 1877.  After the First Boer War 
(1880-1881) returned independence to the Boers, Britain declared its own protectorate in 
the region by intervening in Bechuanaland (Botswana) in 1885.  Discovery of gold in the 
ZAR a year later prompted Britain to charter Cecil B. Rhodes’s British South African 
Company (BSAC) in 1899 after the diamond magnate was able to secure mineral rights 
from King Lobegula of the Ndebele.  Hoping that gold found north of the Transvaal 
could counter ZAR domination in the region, Rhodes led his settler columns into the 
region between the Limpopo River and Lake Tanganyika in 1890.19  While gold 
prospects proved to be disappointing, settlers were able to occupy nearly one-sixth of the 
chartered territory during the 1890s, primarily on the rich central highveld, constituting 
nearly the entire Ndebele kingdom.20
The area known initially as South Zambezi -- and after 1901 Southern Rhodesia -- 
was the center of much conflict in the mid 1890s.  Between 1893 and 1894, the First 
Matabele War pitted King Lobegula and the Ndebele against BSAC settler forces.  While 
      
                                                 
19 John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 191. 
20 Ibid., 205. 
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severely outnumbered, the superior firepower of the British proved overwhelming for the 
Ndebele.  After the suspicious death of Lobegula in 1894, the Ndebele submitted to 
BSAC authority and Matabeleland was brought under settler control.   
However, the BSAC’s newfound authority was short-lived.  In response to the 
aggressive white seizure of land, drought, cattle plague, and locust invasion, the Ndebele 
of Matabeleland, followed by the Shona of Mashonaland, rebelled in 1896 in a series of 
continuous, well organized, and intensely violent acts of dissent against colonial forces.  
What would later become known as the Second Matabele War, or First Chimurenga21
Colonial Land Policies, 1890-1969 
, 
would constitute the official end of native control in the region and leave a bitter memory 
of defeat and subjugation in the hearts and minds of the native population. 
 
 
 
Zimbabwean political discourse has been dominated by the issue of land since the 
first pioneer columns of the BSAC arrived in Mashonaland in 1890.   Initial speculation 
consisted of two hundred free farms amounting to fifteen hundred morgen (3,175 acres) 
each.  However, the continued arrival of speculators, military personnel, missionaries, 
and pseudo-aristocrats in following years caused land holdings by the meager white 
                                                 
21 Chimurenga is a Shona word meaning “struggle.” 
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population to expand to include some sixteen million acres, or nearly one-sixth of all 
available land, by the turn of the century.   
Exacerbating the already virulent tension over white consumption of land was the 
institution of a reserve system in the first decade of the twentieth century which placed 
nearly two-thirds of the Shona population within reserves totaling 37 percent of available 
land in Mashonaland. Similar systems were put into place for the Ndebele in which one-
third of the population lived on just 16 percent of previously held lands.  At roughly 
750,000, the black population was initially capable of surviving within the constraints of 
the reserve system.  However, with the rapid population growth of the following decades, 
overcrowding became a severe problem.  Additionally, despite the possibility that blacks 
would be able to purchase lands outside of the reservations, few could realistically afford 
relocation.   
  With the formalized division between black and white land holdings in Zimbabwe 
through the 1931 Land Appointment Act, explicitly exclusive and racially biased division 
lines were drawn in Southern Rhodesia.  White held lands continued to consume black 
territory not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively.  White settlers -- as of 1931 
numbering less than fifty thousand, with only eleven thousand settled on farms -- now 
possessed nearly half of available land and unquestionably the richest and most fertile 
soil.  The one million strong black population was relegated to roughly twenty million 
acres of sub-standard, often barren territory.   
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 Rapid agricultural expansion following the end of the Second World War and 
subsequent immigration from Europe between 1945 and 1960 created the continual need 
for increasing amounts of land for white settlers.  As a result, greater numbers of blacks 
were forced onto reservations that were already severely overcrowded by a population of 
between two and three million.  Mounting hardships both inside and outside the reserves 
led to rapidly increasing levels of discontent among the black population.  Consequently, 
the post-war years saw the emergence of a swelling tide of nationalism and a call for 
majority rule.  The resulting backlash would result in thirty years of continuously 
repressive legislation by the Southern Rhodesian government and increasingly violent 
responses from the black majority. 
 
 
The Rising Tide of Nationalism 
 
Early attempts at social reform in Southern Rhodesia were a direct response to the 
overwhelming poverty of their constituents.  The foundation of multiracial societies, such 
as the African Capricorn Society, in the early 1950s were not calls for open rebellion, but 
instead championed the end to exclusionary policies instituted by the Southern Rhodesian 
government.  However, with the settler regime’s continued unwillingness to grant 
Africans equal rights under the law, the scope and focus of social movements in the mid-
1950s became far more politicized.  By the end of the decade, Africans in Southern 
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Rhodesia were represented by three political organizations: the City Youth League 
(CYL), the African Voice Association, and the African National Congress (ANC).  To 
further their goals of raising African political consciousness, regardless of education or 
background, the three parties combined to create a unified national party.  The Southern 
Rhodesia African National Congress (SRANC) was launched on September 12, 1957 
with ANC President Joshua Nkomo retaining his position and former CYL party chair 
James Chickerema as Vice-President.22
As the new party increased its influence and spurred rural resistance, the Southern 
Rhodesian government -- despite resignations of influential members such as Federal 
Chief Justice Sir Robert Tredgold -- responded by passing even more restrictive 
legislation including the Unlawful Organizations Act, the Law and Order (Maintenance) 
Act, the Native Affairs Amendment Act, the Preventative Detention Act, and the 
Emergency Powers Act.  Finally, in February 1959, over five hundred members of the 
SRANC were arrested and detained and the party declared unlawful.
       
23
Despite the banning of the SRANC, nationalists were not deterred in their efforts 
and formed the National Democratic Party (NDP) on January 1, 1960.  Soon afterwards, 
with Nkomo reclaiming his position as President, the NDC petitioned the British 
government to hold a constitutional conference that allowed equal representation for all 
parties.  In 1961, Britain acquiesced and an agreement was reached in which Africans 
 
                                                 
22 Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe, 79-80. 
23 SRANC President Joshua Nkomo was able to escape and spent the next eighteen months self-exiled in 
England. 
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were allotted fifteen out of a possible sixty-five seats in the legislature.  Widespread 
discontent swept through nationalist camps, particularly regarding the weakness of 
Nkomo in handling the situation.  As a result, several leading members of the NDP 
publically criticized Nkomo and refused to recognize the new constitution.  Violent 
tactics were employed to prevent Africans from participating in the following year’s 
elections, and by the time relative peace was restored in December 1961 the NDP was 
banned and its leadership – with the exception of Nkomo – was arrested.24
                                                 
24 Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe, 80-82. 
     
 Eight days after the banning of the NDP, Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe African 
Peoples’ Union (ZAPU).  While a direct heritor of the nationalist cause, ZAPU 
broadened its objectives to include: 
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• the institution of a policy of one man, one vote as the basis of government; 
• to maintain the spirit of democracy and love of liberty among the people of 
Zimbabwe; 
• to fight for the total liquidation of imperialism and colonialism, direct and indirect 
and to cooperate with any international forces supporting this struggle; 
• to create conditions for the economic prosperity of the people under a government 
based on the principle of one man, one vote; 
• to foster the spirit of Pan-Africanism and work cooperatively with other 
movements in Africa and elsewhere supporting the spirit of Pan-Africanism; 
• to promote the development of the best values in African culture and traditions 
with a view to establishing a desirable order25
 
 
ZAPU represented Nkomo’s attempt to bring Zimbabwean independence, and the end of 
colonialism in Southern Africa, to the international stage.  While Nkomo was able to 
garner support in the United Nations Assembly and achieve a resolution calling for a new 
constitution, the Rhodesian government responded with increasingly restrictive 
legislation designed to further hamper nationalist insurrection.  ZAPU was banned on 
September 20, 1962, and responding to pressures by Julius Nyerere and other African 
leaders, Nkomo returned to Southern Rhodesia to join his fellow nationalists in 
                                                 
25 Nathan M. Shamuyarira, Crisis in Rhodesia (London: A. Deutsch, 1965), 71. 
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confinement.  By 1963 ZAPU had yet to set into place a clear and decisive course for 
Zimbabwe’s independence beyond petitioning the United Nations and Great Britain. 
 Compounding problems, a new settler regime lead by the right-wing Rhodesian 
Front gained power in 1962 with promises to quell African nationalism and maintain 
white rule.  The death penalty was introduced and the powers of the Law and Order 
(Maintenance) Act were increased.    In response to this new threat, divisions arose 
within ZAPU and resulted in the formation of two rival nationalist organizations, the 
People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) -- a front for Nkomo’s ZAPU -- and the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU), lead by the Methodist clergyman Reverend Ndabaningi 
Sithole in August 1963.  Discord between the two groups soon resulted in violent 
conflicts characterized by pitched battles, gang warfare, petrol bombings, arson, stoning, 
and assaults.26
 As the infighting between the PCC and ZANU spread into the white community, 
the Rhodesian Front government feared that Great Britain would give into nationalist 
pressures for majority rule.  Rhodesian Front leaders saw such an action as an irreversible 
end to their privileged status and the prosperity of Southern Rhodesia.  In response to 
Prime Minister Winston Fields’ unwillingness to enact plans for white independence, he 
was replaced by his deputy Ian Smith.  Smith played on the fears of the white community 
and effectively quelled any voice of dissent by banning all African political parties, 
detaining over two thousand Africans without trial, and banning all national newspapers 
   
                                                 
26 Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder, 33.   
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such as The African Daily News, Zimbabwe Sun, and Chapupu, which championed 
African viewpoints.  Finally, when all negotiations with Great Britain failed to resolve 
the issue of majority rule, Smith announced the unlawful Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965.   
The UDI was initially met with acts of domestic terrorism such as sabotage and 
crop destruction, and organized protests in urban areas.  In total, eighty incidents of 
sabotage occurred between November 1965 and July 1966.  Smith’s racist and 
exceedingly restrictive policies under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act would foster 
more militant attitudes from the PCC and ZANU.   The abolition of African political 
parties, the institution of the Land Tenure Act27, and new Rhodesian Constitution in 
196928
The final straw in the increasingly tense state of Rhodesian race relations came in 
response to the November 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian constitutional proposals granting 
Africans limited franchise and allowing for a gradual increase of Africans in the 
legislature.  The increase would follow a formula which would maintain a white majority 
in the legislature and a de facto one-party state until 2035, resulting in a backlash of what 
Bishop Abel Muzorewa called “the repressed fear, restless silence, forced tolerance and 
hidden hatred” within the African population.  As a result of continued repression by 
 further cemented Smith’s desire to “[sound] the death knell of the notion of 
majority rule.”   
                                                 
27 The Land Tenure Act to permanently infixed racially-based land divisions with a quantitatively balanced 
bisection of territory (forty five million acres each).  However, the most agriculturally prosperous areas 
were retained by the white minority. 
28 The 1969 Land Tenure Act increased the proportion of land designated for white occupation. 
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Smith and the Rhodesian Front, and contemptible attempts in granting African franchise, 
escalated guerilla war broke out in December 1972, beginning almost seven years of 
continued warfare and the end of minority rule in Rhodesia. 
Attitudes of suppression and the resulting powerlessness of the black population 
would result in a crusade to recover lost lands.  The Second Chimurenga of the 1970s 
would be the violent articulation of these attitudes.  More importantly, Robert Mugabe, 
by 1975 one of the two prominent voices of the war for majority rule29
The Rise of Robert Mugabe and the Second Chimurenga 
, first used the 
promise of land to lend mass support to his movement.  This would not be the last 
instance of Mugabe using land reform as a tool of mass mobilization.   
 
 
 
 Robert Mugabe’s story is a common one in African nationalism.  Born Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe on February 21, 1924 to a carpenter father and catechism-teaching 
mother, he was an exceptional student and model example of the Catholic mission 
system.  After receiving his teaching diploma in 1945, Mugabe held multiple positions 
throughout Southern Rhodesia, and in 1949 won a scholarship to Fort Hare University 
College in South Africa.  It was at Fort Hare that Mugabe was first exposed to Marxist 
thought and the nationalist movement.  By the time of his return to Southern Rhodesia in 
                                                 
29 Joshua Nkomo was the second major leader in the war for independence. His Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) party constituted the second half in the divided and often contentious resistance 
movement. 
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1952 -- and throughout his time in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) in the following 
years -- Mugabe had become disenchanted with the system and yet remained distant to 
the calls for independence and resistance.   
 Not until his move to Ghana in 1958 did Mugabe become enamored with the 
prospect of an independent and unified Africa.  As the continent’s first independent 
nation in 1957, Ghana represented the hope and possibility that was unimaginable in 
neighboring colonies.  However, it was on a visit to Southern Rhodesia in May 1960 to 
introduce his fiancée to his parents when Mugabe became a fully awakened nationalist by  
protesting the arrest of friends belonging to the NDP and taking part in what has become 
known as the March of the Seven Thousand.  This transformative experience prompted 
Muagbe to resign his post in Ghana and become a full-time activist.   
For the greater part of the 1960s, Mugabe, along with the majority of high-
ranking Zimbabwean nationalists, was held in indefinite detention.  Between his arrest in 
1963, and his release in 1974, Mugabe underwent intense personal and ideological 
evolutions brought on by the death of his son and his continued academic studies.30  
Emerging from his eleven years of imprisonment, Mugabe was dedicated to the cause of 
revolutionary struggle and the freedom of Zimbabwe from the tyranny of minority rule.31
                                                 
30 Mugabe has earned a total of seven degrees from various academic institutions.  These include a 
Bachelor of Arts in Education from the University of Fort Hare, a Bachelor of Science in Economics from 
the University of London, a Master of Science in Economics from the University of South Africa, as well 
as a Bachelor of Law, Master of Laws, Bachelor of Administration, and Bachelor of Education from the 
University of South Africa.  He also holds thirteen honorary degrees.    
31 Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Plunder, 37. 
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His soft-spoken nature, brilliant intellect, and single-minded ambition served as a both a 
source of admiration and caution amongst his fellow nationalists.   
Upon his release, Mugabe was determined to reconstitute the liberation struggle 
under the ZANU banner.  However, several prominent African statesmen -- notably 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia -- saw Mugabe’s ambitions 
as counterproductive to their goal of a unified front between ZAPU and ZANU.  When, 
in November 1974, ZANU elected Mugabe to replace Ndabaningi Sithole as President, 
Kaunda threatened sanctions against the Zimbabwe African Liberation Army (ZANLA), 
based in Zambia.  Additionally, conflict between the Shona-based ZANLA and the 
Ndebele-dominated Zimbabwe People’s Liberation Army (ZIPRA)32
By 1976, the pressures of constant warfare had exacerbated the decade-old 
embargos of the UDI and forced the Rhodesian government to adjust their stance on 
majority rule.  As of 1978, the war accounted for 40 percent of government spending, and 
15 percent of the GDP.
 resulted in open 
conflict between the rival organizations.  However, by 1977, primarily due to his efforts 
in organizing guerillas in Mozambique, the assassination of popular ZANLA commander 
Herbert Chipeto, and his ability to discredit Sithole, Mugabe was able to gain the support 
of guerilla leaders and bring ZANU fully under his control, forcing his immediate 
recognition as the primary leader of armed resistance in Rhodesia. 
33
                                                 
32 ZANLA was the military wing of ZANU, while ZIPRA was the military wing of ZAPU, both conducted 
military operations from bases in Zambia and Mozambique.   
33 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review, first quarter 1978, 3. 
  Additionally, in 1979 Smith announced that the cost of the war 
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had quadrupled over its five years.34  In the 1979-1980 budget, defense and security 
accounted for 37 percent of projected expenditures and the national deficit had grown to 
$Rh 460,000,000.35
After being rejected in their earlier advances by nationalist still residing in 
Salisbury, the Smith regime finally submitted to a settlement that would grant majority 
rule while protecting white interests, much to the distaste of ZANU and ZAPU.  
However, when it became clear in mid-1979 that the British government would not 
recognize the new Zimbabwe Rhodesia government under Bishop Abel Muzorewa all 
nationalist organizations joined in new negotiations at Lancaster House in London.
    
36
From February 27-29, 1980, closely supervised elections were held that included 
nine political parties.  The Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) won an 
overwhelming majority, fifty-seven seats and 63 percent of the vote.  Mugabe was asked 
to form the new government as Prime Minister while Canaan Banana, a Methodist 
minister and long-time advocate for racial justice, was named President.
  
After three months of intense debate and bargaining, an agreement was reached that 
established a new constitution and procedures for a transfer of power.  In mid-December 
British authority was temporarily reinstated and a cease-fire effected, and United Nations 
sanctions lifted.   
37
 
   
                                                 
34 Financial Times, July 27, 1979.   
35 Robert Fraser, ed., Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing’s Ltd., 1979) 
36 Under the initial agreement, Rhodesia was renamed Zimbabwe Rhodesia.   
37 Harold D. Nelson, ed., Zimbabwe: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, The 
American University, 1983), xxxi-xxxii.   
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Table 2.1.  Results of Common Roll Elections, 1980 
  Party Total Valid Votes 
Cast 
Percent of Valid 
Votes 
Seats 
NDU 15,056 0.568 0 
NFZ 18,794 0.709 0 
PF  638,879 24.113 20 
UANC 219,307 8.277 3 
UNFP 5,796 0.219 0 
UPAM 1,181 0.045 0 
ZANU 53,343 2.013 0 
ZANU (PF) 1,668,992 62.992 57 
ZDP 28,181 1.064 0 
Source: House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Africa, 96th Cong., 2d sess. 
 
Few thought the election of Mugabe, a noted Marxist and radical guerilla organizer, as 
Prime Minister to be plausible.  However, according to Richard M. Moose, former 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mugabe’s candidacy was strengthened 
when viewed in the African context as well as from several factors including: 
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• his image as a nationalist who organized the principal and most successful 
fighting force; 
• his identification with the majority Shona tribal group; 
• his ability to project himself as a winner; 
• Muzorewa’s relatively lackluster performance during his period in office and his 
close identification with the whites and with South Africa.38
 
For Nkomo, who believed himself to be the “Father of Zimbabwe,” the loss to ZANU-PF 
was a bitter pill to swallow.  His victory in the Matabeleland Province had granted his 
Patriotic Front twenty seats, but relegated Nkomo to nothing more than a regional leader 
of the Ndebele and Kalanga people.  Initially offered the ceremonial post of President, 
Nkomo declined and instead accepted the position of Minister of Home Affairs, which 
controlled the police.  However, the distrust and political humiliation suffered at the 
hands of Mugabe would foreshadow the continued feud between the two prominent 
figures of Zimbabwean independence. 
 
 Zimbabwe’s independence marked the end of seventy years of economic, 
political, and social oppression at the hands of settler society.  Under the socialist vision 
of Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe attempted to rectify the injustices of the colonial period 
while simultaneously seeking reconciliation with long-time enemies.  However, the 
                                                 
38 Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Results of the Recent 
Elections in Zimbabwe, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 8. 
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divided nature of Zimbabwean society -- punctuated by decades of land stratification and 
subjugation by the minority white population -- remained despite the transfer to majority 
rule.  Additionally, competition between Mugabe and Nkomo fostered deep distrust 
among their respective political parties, placing strain on democratic principles.  As 
Zimbabwe entered its first decade of independence, it faced significant questions about 
the integration of colonial institutions into the new majority government, the 
redistribution of land to the dispossessed masses, the impact of international donor aide 
on Zimbabwe’s economic performance, and potential conflict between Mugabe’s 
socialist vision and Western democratic principles.  The following chapter will analyze 
these issues as well as how Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s fledgling government strove to 
define themselves as an independent people free from the chains of colonialism. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ZIMBABWE’S FIRST DECADE OF 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
This chapter analyzes the first decade of Zimbabwe’s independence under 
majority rule and the political developments that contributed to economic, social, and 
political crises in the following decades.  It traces the evolution of ZANU-PF from an 
organization born in the midst of radical guerilla warfare and intense political oppression 
to one attempting political consolidation and ideological revolution.  Specifically, this 
chapter illustrates three key factors that shaped the first decade of Zimbabwean 
development.  First, the virulent issue of land reform and the unwillingness of the new 
majority government to abolish policies that strengthened colonial institutions and forged 
unhealthy relationships between private enterprise and government interests.  Second, the 
changing global market and international lenders’ impact on Zimbabwe’s economy, and 
third, the rise of a de facto one-party state following the Matabeleland Massacres and 
rising unrest among civil society groups.   
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Post-Independence Land Reform, 1980-1989 
 
Zimbabwe’s independence and the introduction of a multi-racial democratic 
society marked the end of seventy years of oppressive political, economic, and social 
controls.  Despite its newfound sovereignty, one of the major obstacles facing the 
fledgling government was the unequal allocation of quality land and the inability of 
small-scale commercial farmers to procure arable tracts.   Under the Land Tenure Act of 
1969, land was quantitatively equal, but was qualitatively poor for black Zimbabweans.  
Table 3.1.  Principle Land Categories under the Land Tenure Act of 1969 
Land Category Area (Hectacres) Percent of Total 
 
European Land 
  
 
General Farming Land 
 
15,337,096 
 
39.4 
Other Land – Parks, Forests, etc. 2,768,020 7.1 
Total 18,145,116 46.5 
 
African Land 
  
 
Tribal Trust Land (Communal) 
 
16,291,670 
 
41.7 
APL (SSCF) 1,415,921 3.6 
Other Land – Parks, Forests, etc. 494,617 1.6 
Total 18,202,084 46.6 
   
National Land 2,727,617 6.9 
Total Zimbabwean Land 39,074,817 100.0 
Source: Sam Moyo, “The Land Question,” Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of 
Transition, 1980-1986, ed. Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1986), 168. 
 
The impetus of resettlement was derived from a historical precedent of landlessness at the 
hands of white settlers, and represented a vehicle of mass mobilization utilized 
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extensively during the liberation war.  After independence, the landless majority sought 
reparations for the seven decades of injustice imposed upon them by settlers.  However, 
under the terms of the Lancaster House Agreements foreign aid was dependent upon the 
reallocation of land on a willing buyer-willing seller basis.  This practice would result in 
divisions between the socialist goals of Mugabe and the complexities of Zimbabwe’s 
inherited economic system, entrench of the white minority for years to come, and create a 
festering desire for radical resettlement in the following decades.   
While the majority of the African population believed that the new majority 
government would bring about radical social, political, and economic changes, Mugabe 
declared shortly after ZANU-PF’s victory that: 
 
“We will ensure that there is a place for everyone in this country.  We want to ensure a 
sense of security for both the winners and the losers.  There will be no sweeping 
nationalization; the pensions and jobs of civil servants are guaranteed; farmers will keep 
their land.  Let us forgive and forget.  Let us join hands in a new amity.”39
                                                 
39 David Caute, Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1983), quoted in Ibbo Mandaza, ed., Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986 
(Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1986),  42. 
 
 
Therefore, rather than dismantling the old guard, Mugabe instead curbed the socialist 
ambitions of his constituency and maintained the long-held status quo, continuing the 
statist economy that had strictly regulated foreign exchange, imports, and prices for the 
past fifteen years.   According to Alfred Nhema: 
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“While Mugabe extolled the virtues of socialism to his own African supporters, no 
exhortations of that nature were preached to white capitalists.  To their pleasant surprise 
the whites discovered that hegemonic control they had attained through military and 
political means could still be retained via the forces of economics.”40
With the overwhelming majority of Zimbabwe’s GDP coming from white owned 
industry, mining, and business, it was imperative for the economic stability of Zimbabwe 
that the white community be allowed to maintain their holdings after independence.  In 
the prophetic words of Ian Smith, “They [whites] have the skills and the capital.  I’m not 
a racist, but it’s the story of Africa: Every black country that forces its whites to leave has 
become a tragedy.”
 
 
41  The aforementioned provisions in the Lancaster House Agreements 
made foreign aid contingent on the protection of property, specifically land, thus making 
ZANU-PF’s goal of radical redistribution unfeasible.  While some see Lancaster House 
as a continuation of unequal land policies and a direct bridge from imperialism to neo-
colonialism, the fact remains that after witnessing the chaotic destabilization that 
occurred after the white exodus from Mozambique, Mugabe and ZANU-PF recognized 
the pragmatism behind maintaining large-scale agricultural production and a white 
cornerstone of the economy.  In 1981, agricultural exports accounted for 46 percent of 
Zimbabwe’s total domestic export value.42
                                                 
40 Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe (Harare, Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2002), 104. 
41 Ian Smith, interview in Newsweek, March 9, 1981, 13, quoted in Alan F. Pater, What They Said in 1981 
(Beverly Hills, CA: Monitor Books Co., 1982). 
42 Sam Moyo, “The Land Question,” in Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, ed. 
Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1986), 191. 
  Therefore, with the appointment of Dennis 
Norman of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) as Agriculture Minister, the 
cooperation between settler strongholds and the new Zimbabwean government began.   
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  Despite the early limitations placed on ZANU-PF, the government began 
implementing limited land reform through the policy of “moderation and reconciliation” 
in 1981.  A White Paper on economic policy entitled “Growth with Equity,” published in 
February 1981, stated that one of the government’s main objectives was “to end 
imperialist exploitation and achieve a greater and more equitable degree of ownership of 
natural resources, including land, and to promote participation in, and ownership of, a 
significant portion of the economy by nationals and the state.”43  However, the plan also 
stressed the importance of the white community in maintaining Zimbabwe’s economy, 
thus making white farmers “something of a protected species.”44
 Under “moderation and reconciliation” the majority of Rhodesia’s state 
bureaucracy and officials retained their positions.  While Mugabe’s Africanization policy 
assured that the majority of Zimbabwe’s civil servants were black
 
45, whites still 
comprised the upper echelons of power.  In a blatant contradiction of their liberation war 
promises of land redistribution on the people’s terms, ZANU-PF offered land not as the 
historical right of the dispossessed, but instead under the banner of production and state 
regulation.46
                                                 
43 Government of Zimbabwe, Growth With Equity: An Economic Policy Statement (Harare: Government 
Printer, 1981).   
44 Robin Palmer, “Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990,” African Affairs 89, no. 355 (April 1990), 167. 
45 Fraser, Keesings, 1981, 33129. 
46 Alexander, The Unsettled Land, 106. 
  Throughout the early 1980s, resettlement goals grew at substantial rates.   
1980 target goals were eighteen thousand families, based primarily on need and 
effectively managing the communal reserves.  By 1981, the number was tripled to fifty-
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four thousand families, and in 1982 tripled again to 162,000 families.47
 Therefore, the fundamental question surrounding land redistribution in the first 
decade of independence was the comprehensive value of settled lands.  Quantity, natural 
quality, and access to water for irrigation were all of significant consequence for those 
seeking tracts for private and small-scale commercial use.  More so, at the outset of 
independence, the distribution of arable land still reflected the qualitative inequality of 
land settlement.
  While the 1981-
1982 and 1982-1983 financial years accounted for seventy percent of land purchases 
through 1989, by 1985, only thirty-five thousand families had been resettled on the less-
desired tracts of former “European” land.   
48
Table 3.2.  Distribution of Irrigation-Based Farming by Agricultural Subsector, 
1981 
 
Agricultural Subsector Area in 
Hectares 
Percentage  
    
Large Company Estates 30,400 23.4 
Commercial Settler Farms 10,500 8.1 
Commercial Farm Units 80,000 61.5 
ARDA (Tilcor) Estates and Settlers    5,900 4.5 
Small-Scale Irrigation in Communal Areas    2,800 2.2 
Small Community Irrigation Schemes       400 0.3 
   
Total 130,000 100.0  
Source:  Whitsun Foundation, 1981 
 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 113. 
48 Sam Moyo, “The Land Question,” in Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986, ed. 
Ibbo Mandaza (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1986), 180. 
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  However, a lack of international funding for the purchase of new lands, coupled 
with a new emphasis on production, caused a significant shift in land reform during the 
mid-1980s.  The rising black middle class feared that the reallocation of land to a 
relatively unskilled black peasantry would inevitably harm Zimbabwe’s economic 
prosperity.  With the publication of the Communal Lands Development Plan in 1985 and 
the First Five-Year Plan in 1986, agrarian reform expanded its definition to include 
“translocation settlement” (what had traditionally been known as merely “resettlement”) 
and “internal resettlement” (a reorganization of the reserves where the majority of the 
population lived).  Under internal resettlement twenty thousand families were to be 
moved annually into planned villages located in each district while arable land was 
divided into blocks with rotational grazing and irrigation programs.  As a result, the 
redistribution of land became of secondary importance, and a technocratic policy 
centered on maintaining pre-independence production levels superseded the traditional 
communal social hierarchies.  The choice of villigisation over resettlement proceeded 
slowly and caused misgivings from both those scheduled for resettlement as well as from 
the district councils.  Additionally, the lack of cooperation, coordination, and education 
on the part of the councils caused many of the pilot villages to remain unoccupied as late 
as 1988.49
 By the end of the 1980s, land reform came to represent the contradictory policies 
of first decade of independence.  While public policy advocated social welfarism and the 
 
                                                 
49 Alexander, The Unsettled Land, 118-122. 
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resettlement of underutilized land on a willing buyer-willing seller basis, the lack of 
international financial support, resistance by the CFU, and the emergence of a 
technocratic policy of villigisation and internal resettlement overtook the socialist ideals 
of the liberation war.  In the words of Hevina Dashwood: 
 
“While some saw justice [redistribution of wealth] as based on the concept of 
scientific socialism, others saw justice as the right to take part in and profit from 
the existing capitalist structure, a right which had been largely denied them under 
the previous racist regimes.”50
                                                 
50 Hevina S. Dashwood, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000), 32. 
 
 
Additionally, the aforementioned rise of the new black middle class drastically 
altered the political and economic composition of Zimbabwe in the first decade of 
independence.  With the emergence of black entrepreneurs as owners of large scale 
commercial farms and the embourgeoisement of the new ruling elite, significant divisions 
arose within the state that pressed for a market-based economy and minimal land 
redistribution instead of socialism.  However, decreased production as a result of drought, 
changes in international politics following the end of the Cold War, increased corruption 
within the Zimbabwean government, and clashes with civil society resulted in drastic 
changes in Zimbabwe’s economic and political collateral.  These issues will be addressed 
with greater detail in the next chapter.  First, it is necessary to examine Zimbabwe’s 
economy in the first decade of independence and the impacts it had on the political 
stability of the country. 
39 
 
Economic Realities of Independence and the Rise of International Financial Institutions 
 
Zimbabwe’s post-independence economy has been the subject of much scholarly 
debate since the institution of structural adjustment and economic liberalization in 1991.  
Scholars have focused on the government’s preservation of power superseding the 
implementation of its war-time promises of wealth redistribution.  While early policy 
emphasized rural development, increased access to public services, employment 
opportunities, and reconciliation with the white community, Mugabe quickly recognized 
the necessity of co-opting white business interests over socialist reform.  Despite early 
dissention and mistrust by both sides, by the time of Mugabe’s reelection in 1985 and the 
consolidation of ZANU-PF power following the 1987 Unity Accords, white business 
interests also realized the necessity of cooperation and national unity for economic 
stability.  
  Throughout the early 1980s, Zimbabwe’s statist economy maintained 
strong oversight on foreign exchange, imports, and prices.  Industry was protected from 
foreign competition, and state-owned businesses monopolized the domestic market.  A 
large portion of commodities (beef, dairy, grain, etc.) were heavily regulated, and ZANU-
PF took control over industry and financial institutions.51
                                                 
51 Laasko, Liisa, “Research Debates in Zimbabwe: From Analysis to Practice,” in Twenty Years of 
Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 
19. 
   Maintaining Ian Smith’s 
isolationist mindset, Zimbabwe’s ideological stance existed in opposition to conservative 
governments in the United States and Western Europe who were in favor of 
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privatization.52
                                                 
52 Nhema, Democracy in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 2002), 105. 
    The country’s First Five-Year National Development Plan laid out the 
groundwork through which Zimbabwe would attempt to achieve sustained economic 
expansion through state investment and cooperation with private enterprise.  According 
to the plan, growth would be achieved through: 
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(I) establishment by the state of new enterprises in strategic industries; 
(II) state participation in existing strategic enterprises with the role of the state 
gradually increasing until majority or full ownership by the state; 
(III) joint ventures between the state and private capital on terms which allow 
for eventual ownership by the state; 
(IV) establishment of co-operative ventures in industry, commerce, trade and 
agriculture as well as participation of local authorities in the economy; 
(V) workers’ education in management, technical skills and ideology in order 
to increase the efficiency of workers and their ability to participate in the 
running of enterprises as well as increase their ideological consciousness; 
and 
(VI) encouragement and acceptance of private local investment and foreign 
investment on terms conducive to, or consistent with socialist 
transformation53
Between 1980 and 1982 Zimbabwe’s economy saw booms resulting from renewed 
international investment, the lifting of UDI sanctions, and favorable harvests.  However, 
by 1982 the growth of the previous two years was overtaken by sharp global economic 
decline and regional drought.  While the IMF and World Bank were able to curtail the 
slump in 1983, Zimbabwe’s economy never returned to its previous levels.  Heavy 
 
                                                 
53 Republic of Zimbabwe, First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990 (Harare, Zimbabwe: 
Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, 1986), 10. 
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emphasis on social welfare programs only exacerbated spending and forced the 
government to radically shift its development goals.  Unlike many African countries, 
Zimbabwe was able to effectively manage this debt; however, it was ultimately forced to 
curb heavy spending on healthcare, education, and land reform in order to maintain 
production levels for debt repayment.   
Table 3.3.  Zimbabwe’s Foreign Trade 1979-1985 ($ Million) 
 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Export FOB 1080 1446 1451 1312 1154 1174 1243 
Import FOB 875 1339 1534 1472 1070 989 1003 
Source: Republic of Zimbabwe 
 
Zimbabwe’s continued economic deterioration was a result of failure by ZANU-
PF to reform the statist economic structures inherited from the UDI and international 
factors including drastically rising interest rates, oil costs, and a drop in the price of 
commodities.54
                                                 
54 Dashwood, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy, 58. 
  While the drop in commodity prices in the 1980s was offset by increased 
volume, it was unavoidable for Zimbabwe and many Sub-Saharan African countries to 
borrow heavily from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to counter trade deficits 
and balance of payments.  Even though Zimbabwe had strong international support in the 
early 1980s, donor aide and income levels were not substantial enough to curtail rising 
foreign debt.  Additionally, increased cooperation between IFIs and major donor 
countries such as the United States and Great Britain only cemented the relationship 
between the Bretton Woods institutions and international aid to Africa.  By the beginning 
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of the 1990s, this relationship would be central in the push for structural adjustment and 
Zimbabwe’s eminent crisis. 
 However, by the end of the decade, the ineptitude of Zimbabwe’s state-business 
nexus became obvious.  Excess and graft overran the bureaucracy, causing it to swell to 
monumental proportions.  As a result, budget deficits and public debt skyrocketed, the 
country became increasingly dependent on external markets, and foreign investment 
rapidly decreased.  As a result of fiscal ineptitude and the necessity of economic 
liberalization, civil society groups that had once been the source of strength for Mugabe 
and ZANU-PF began to exercise their roles as watchdogs with ever-increasing prejudice. 
 
 
The One-Party State and Civil Society Watchdogs 
 
 While the 1980s are generally considered a period of relative stability and 
progress in Zimbabwe, the fear of counter-revolution supported by ZAPU was a constant 
source of concern for ZANU-PF.  Between 1980 and 1988, the Matabeleland Provinces 
of western and southern Zimbabwe were inundated with dissident attacks and 
government reprisals.  Even though scholars have dismissed the popular belief that these 
insurrections were the result of ethnic rivalries between ZANU and ZAPU; facts 
substantiate that ethic affiliations played a major role in dissident activities.  While the 
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majority of those considered dissidents came from ex-ZIPRA units, Mugabe and ZANU-
PF relied heavily on a Shona-centric Task Force to assure regional stability.   
 The most blatant example of ethnic favoritism was the formation of the North 
Korean trained Five Brigade in October 1981.  Their existence outside of the normal 
army command structure, Shona background, and direct control by the Prime Minister’s 
office assured a rapid and direct response to any perceived threat.  Despite limited acts of 
insurrection in the first two years of independence, when arms caches were discovered on 
land owned by ZAPU in 1982, Mugabe immediately expelled Nkomo and three of his 
senior advisors from the cabinet.  Less than a year later, in January 1983, Five Brigade 
was dispatched to Matabeleland North, murdering over two thousand civilians, beating 
countless more, and burning hundreds of homesteads.  By January 1984, Five Brigade 
had moved into Matabeleland South and implemented strict curfews and transportation 
restrictions.55
 In retrospect, the motivations of Operation Gukurahundi
  Official reasoning for such heavy-handed tactics was that without Five 
Brigade, dissidents would have overwhelmed the provinces, allowing South Africa to 
gain a foothold in the region.   
56
                                                 
55 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence, 
Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988 
(Harare: Legal Resources Foundation Legal Publications Unit, 1999), 15. 
56 Gukurahundi is a Shona word meaning “the rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains.” 
 were purely political.  
Removal of Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU opposition, whose support was based in the Ndebele 
population of the Matabelelands, was of paramount importance to Mugabe heading into 
the 1985 general elections.  When votes were tallied, Mugabe was once again victorious, 
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gaining 76 percent of the vote (a 12 percent increase).  While ZAPU was able to gain 
fifteen seats in the legislature (a five seat loss), the party was no longer able to function as 
a stable political entity due to its imprisoned and displaced leadership and absence from 
Muagbe’s cabinet.   
 Beginning in late 1985, ZANU-PF began negotiating the integration of ZAPU 
into ZANU-PF with little success.  In response to Nkomo’s refusal of integration and 
demands for a coalition government, and claiming that ZAPU actively supported 
dissident movements, Cain Nkala, Minister of Public Affairs, banned ZAPU public 
meetings, closed its offices nationwide, and dissolved six ZAPU-dominated local 
governments.57  As a result of their newfound political impotency and increased 
harassment at the hands of ZANU-PF, Nkomo reluctantly agreed to resume talks.  On 
December 22, 1987 the Unity Accord Agreement was signed, officially integrating 
ZAPU in ZANU-PF, cementing Mugabe as head of both parties, and beginning a de facto 
one-party state in Zimbabwe.58
 Ultimately, the Unity Accords were a political contradiction.  While the power of 
the executive had been significantly increased, the senate was abolished and thirty non-
constituency seats were added in Parliament, including twelve presidential appointees.
  
59
                                                 
57 Eliakim M. Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency 
in Southern Rhodesia (Trenton, NJ: Africa Word Press, Inc., 2005), 272. 
58 Government o Zimbabwe, Unity Accord Agreement, December 22, 1987. 
59 Liisa Laasko, “Opposition Politics in Independent Zimbabwe,” African Studies Quarterly 7, no.2 & 3 
(Spring 2003). 
  
In response to stagnant economic policies and the unchecked power of the one-party 
state, civil society organizations grew in militancy and took on an ever-increasing role as 
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government watchdogs.  Through media outlets, trade and labor unions, NGOs, churches, 
and student movements, ZANU-PF found themselves under an increasing cloud of 
scrutiny.  This trend would reach its zenith in the mid-to-late 1990s.     
 The primary concern for civil society groups was the need for democratization 
and pluralism following the Unity Accords.  Mugabe’s unabashed call for a one-party 
state and ZANU-PF’s increasing involvement in corruption scandals led student 
organizations to publically protest the state of affairs.  Government overreaction in the 
form of riot police, arrests, and closing of the University of Zimbabwe harkened back to 
the oppressive tactics employed under the Smith regime.  Consequently, union leaders 
such as Morgan Tsvangirai, secretary-general of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU), publically supported student protests.  He was afterwards detained for 
six weeks without trial.60
 However, no amount of political pressure or fear tactics could prevent the graft 
and cronyism of ZANU-PF from eventually coming out.  Scandals such as Willowgate, 
in which businessmen, politicians, and civil servants attempted to sell automobiles on the 
black market at inflated prices, revealed how the new elite were attempting to use their 
positions of power and influence for personal financial gains, a direct affront to the 
Marxist-Leninist principles they publically subscribed to.  Additionally, discrepancies in 
the salaries and standards of living for ministers and many dispossessed ex-combatants 
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lead to deep disillusionment and frustration compounded by Zimbabwe’s declining 
economy.   
 Defense of multipartyism in the 1980s culminated with the formation of the 
Zimbabwe United Movement (ZUM) by former ZANU-PF Secretary-General Edgar 
Tekere in 1989.  ZUM represented the pervasive cynicism in Zimbabwean society and 
the desire for an end to the corruption that had began to cripple its government and 
economy.  Unfortunately, due to harassment, financial limitations, and a lack of media 
access, Tekere and ZUM won only two out of a possible 120 seats and achieved no 
lasting political change in the 1990 general elections.  However, by gaining 18 percent of 
the vote in parliamentary elections and 17 percent for Tekere, ZUM laid the foundation 
for a society where discourse and pluralism superseded repression and one-partyism.   
 As the 1980s drew to a close, Zimbabwe had undergone a transformation from an 
isolationist nation dominated by the vestiges of colonialism and minority rule to the great 
hope of Sub-Saharan Africa.  However, as the second decade of independence began, 
Zimbabwe faced increasing pressures to abide by the mandates of a neo-liberal Western 
economy in the post-Cold War era.  In addition to mounting debts and falling 
commodities, the ideological revolution that had defined the independence movement for 
fifteen years failed to inspire a critical citizenry.  With this new era came mounting 
obstacles and increasingly vocal opponents who threatened ZANU-PF’s stranglehold on 
power.  The following chapter will analyze Mugabe’s reactions to these challengers, as 
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well as how Zimbabwe declined into a nation defined by authoritarianism and reactionary 
politics.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: ZIMBABWE’S SECOND DECADE OF 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
 
This chapter analyzes the international and domestic issues which defined 
Zimbabwe’s second decade under majority rule, beginning with the onset of economic, 
political, and social problems at the end of the 1980s and leading to radical land 
redistribution by the end of the decade.  Specifically, it examines three primary issues 
central to the rise of authoritarianism and the eventual dissolution of democratic 
institutions.  First, World Bank and IMF sponsored economic liberalization and its impact 
on Zimbabwe’s economy and land redistribution schemes; second, the rising tension 
between civil society organizations (CSOs) and the Zimbabwean government over a 
breakdown in democratic institutions, intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and the lack of compensation for long-forgotten veterans of the Second Chimurenga; and 
third, widespread land seizures by war veterans following the failed constitutional 
referendum of 2000 and ZANU-PF’s implementation of Fast-Track land reform. 
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Economic Decline and Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment 
 
 Zimbabwe’s economic deterioration at the end of the 1980s was primarily due to 
wasteful state expenditure and policies that favored colonial institutions deemed 
necessary for economic viability.  Widespread corruption and cronyism, failed 
management of parastatals, dependence on external markets, and the loss of private 
investment led to increasing public debt.  By 1990, continued development along the 
lines of Mugabe’s socialist vision was unfeasible and conflicted with the realities of neo-
liberal Western economics.  Therefore, under pressure from the World Bank and IMF, the 
Ministry of Finance announced in 1991 the adoption of an Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program (ESAP) package.  The ESAP package mandated the following 
conditions: economic liberalization, currency devaluation, and removal of government 
subsidies.  
ESAP was derived from neo-liberal economic theory, which believes companies 
grow best through trade liberalization and access to new production methods.  
Competition through importation encourages specialization and diversification and weeds 
out inefficient producers through a form of economic natural selection.  Furthermore, 
open trade improves welfare conditions due to increased opportunity and decreased 
poverty.  A more concise definition describes neo-liberalism as “a means towards 
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enhancing human development, social welfare, and sustainable growth and 
development.”61
Despite previous failures where structural adjustment caused “misery, increased 
hardships, deterioration of human development, destruction of poor peoples’ livelihoods, 
[destruction of the] environment, high rates of inequality, [and the] marginalization of 
poor countries and their communities,”
   
62 Zimbabwe was forced to accept ESAP in order 
to receive additional loans from Bretton Woods institutions.  To combat critics of ESAP, 
officials emphasized the program’s “homegrown” nature, claiming that unlike previous 
attempts to introduce neo-liberal economic reforms in the developing world, Zimbabwe 
would protect its citizenry from the pitfalls of liberalization.  However, critics of ESAP 
have recently posited that ZANU-PF’s true motivation for introducing economic 
liberalization was that after a decade of independence the state was no longer a viable 
medium for wealth acquisition.63
                                                 
61 Moses Tekere, “Trade Liberalization Under Structural Economic Adjustment-Impact on Social Welfare 
in Zimbabwe,” (paper presented at the Poverty Reduction Forum for the Structural Adjustment Program 
Review Initiative,Harare, Zimbabwe, April 9-10, 2001), 4. 
62 Ibid., 4. 
63 Rob Davies, “Memories of Underdevelopment: A Personal Experience of Zimbabwe’s Economic 
Decline,” in Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation, eds. Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage 
(Harare: Waver Press, 2004), 29.  
  Regardless, structural adjustment effectively ended the 
decades-old state interventionalism that had resulted in a bloated bureaucracy a little 
room for capital investment.  
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Table 4.1.  Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Income, 1985-1990 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Wages & Salaries 47.7 49.1 53.7 49.1 47.2 47.0 
Surplus 52.9 51.4 46.7 50.8 52.4 52.9 
Rent 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.3 
Source: Calculated from Quarterly Digest of Statistics, CSO December 1999 in Godfrey 
Kanyenze, “Performance of the Zimbabwean Economy, 1980-2000,” in Twenty Years f 
Independence in Zimbabwe. 
 
Key goals of the ESAP were: 
 
• Achieve GDP growth of 5 percent between 1991-1995; 
• Raise savings to 25 percent of the GDP; 
• Raise investment to 25 percent of the GDP; 
• Achieve and export growth of 9 percent per annum; 
• Reduce the budget deficit from over 10 percent of the GDP to five percent by 
1995; 
• Reduce inflation from 17.7 percent to 10 percent by 199564
While the primary reasoning for structural adjustment was to help countries 
prevent crippling debt, currency devaluation and higher interest rates made repayment 
more expensive, further increasing budget deficits.  In order to achieve their adjustment 
goals, the Zimbabwean government suspended its statist measures of price controls and 
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subsidies, and set specific goals that included the removal of export incentives, phasing 
out import licensing, eliminating foreign currency controls, reducing tariffs, removing 
surtaxes, raising the minimum duty to 10 percent, and achieving an export growth rate of 
9 percent from 1991 to 1995.  Unfortunately, core stakeholder groups such as small scale 
commercial farmers, labor, and small businesses were not thoroughly consulted before 
the policy was implemented resulting in a lack of national ownership. However, big 
business groups, and especially the black bourgeoisie, were well informed and 
represented by the government-sponsored Indigenous Business Development Center 
(IBDC).  
 Central to Zimbabwe’s structural adjustment was the effect of liberalization on 
land redistribution and the conflict between white and black capital.  Due to sweeping 
indigenization programs of the late 1980s and early 1990s many indigenous elites sought 
to become large scale commercial farmers.65
                                                 
65 Sam Moyo, “Land Reform and Zimbabwe’s Troubled Transition to Democratic Governance,” in 
Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences, eds.  Julius 
Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere and John Mukum Mbaku  (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 324. 
  While the indigenization lobby pressed for 
deracilization and land ownership reclassification, reforms continued to benefit white-
owned large scale farms, further retarding rural development and deepening racial 
divides.  While the IBDC’s initial mission was to aid small and medium-sized black 
entrepreneurs, as the decade progressed the organization became further aligned with the 
international donor community, shifting their focus towards acquiring equity in large 
corporations rather than supporting the development of new ones.   
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 ESAP represented a fundamental shift in the priorities of land redistribution.  
Policies in the 1980s sought to rectify unequal allocation by affording property rights to a 
wide spectrum of the population.  The government hoped that by appropriating land for 
the landless, war veterans, commercial farm workers, and refugees, that economic growth 
and a heightened level of political stability would be reached through promoting national 
self-sufficiency and agricultural development.66
 By failing to adhere to a strict fiscal policy and succumbing to the destabilizing 
affects of structural adjustment, Zimbabwe’s economy began a half-decade of serious 
decline and increased indebtedness.  Real economic growth decreased from a rate of 4 
percent from 1985-1990 to a paltry 0.9 percent during ESAP.  Employment grew at only 
0.8 percent, compared to 2.4 percent in the previous five years, and inflation skyrocketed 
from an annual average of 11.6 percent to 27.6 percent.  Reduction of government 
subsidies severely degraded public enterprises, amounting to $3.8 billion in losses from 
1992 to 1994.  Consequently, the government had to borrow heavily causing outstanding 
  Under structural adjustment and its 
emphasis on diversification, large-scale farmers were able to erode the land rights of the 
peasant majority by promising economic growth.  Therefore, land policies shifted from 
an emphasis on wealth realignment and indigenization to capitalizing on the most 
profitable export-based commodities.    
                                                 
66 Ibid., 326. 
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debt to rise from 42.5 percent of the GDP in 1990 to 82.6 percent in 1993 before 
dropping to 66.9 percent in 1995.67
Table 4.2.  Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance 
   
Economic Sector Before ESAP (1985-1991) After ESAP (1992-1997) 
Real GDP Growth 5.3% 3.2% 
Agriculture 6.6% 10.0% 
Manufacturing 8.9% -0.7% 
Mining 4.5% 2.3% 
Source: Moses Tekere, “Trade Liberalization Under Structural Economic Adjustment-
Impact on Social Welfare in Zimbabwe,” (paper presented at the Poverty Reduction 
Forum for the Structural Adjustment Program Review Initiative, April 2001), 7. 
  
By 1995, NGO poverty analysts concluded that the negative impacts of structural 
adjustment on the economy and poverty alleviation far outweighed any positives.  World 
Bank assessments concurred with independent studies and conceded that: 
“The concerns…go beyond the issues of pace and design: the comprehensiveness of the 
program seems a fundamental issue, especially given the objective of reducing poverty.  
Given the highly dualistic nature of Zimbabwe’s economy (where the white minority 
dominates formal sector economic activity and owns two-thirds of high potential land, 
and the black majority is concentrated in rural, communal areas and the urban informal 
sector), it would appear that some basic questions were not explicitly addressed at the 
outset.  First, would ESAP, predicated on the formal sector acting as an engine of growth 
create sufficient jobs, quickly enough, to address the serious problems of 
employment?...Even realization of the most optimistic scenarios for formal sector growth 
will not provide a quick solution to the unemployment problem.”68
Regardless of ESAP’s flawed design, the IMF’s suspension of loans in 1995 had little to 
do with their own shortcomings and everything to do with Zimbabwe’s inability to curb 
their budget deficit and manage their balance of payments.  Ultimately, “[L]iberalization 
 
 
                                                 
67 Kanyenze, “The Zimbabwean Economy 1980-2003,” 124.  
68 World Bank, Performance Audit Report: Zimbabwe Structural Adjustment Program, Report no. 14751, 
June 30, 1995, 23. 
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proceed[ed] ahead of deficit control, leading to declining growth and insurmountable 
obstacles to debt reduction.”69
Civil Society Challenges to State Power 
  
 
 
 
ESAP’s failure and the Zimbabwe’s deteriorating economic climate caused the 
government to look for alternative means of economic revitalization.  However, the 
widespread unpopularity of ESAP resulted in two years of indecision on the part of 
economic policy makers.  It was not until 1998 that the government launched the 
Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST).  Under 
ZIMPREST Zimbabwe sought an annual GDP growth of 6 percent, the addition of 
42,200 new jobs per annum, a per capita income growth of 3.4 percent, and a 4.4 percent 
growth in consumption.  To achieve these goals, Zimbabwe needed to decrease their 
budget from 10 to 5 percent of their GDP, reduce inflation from 20 percent to single 
digits by the year 2000, increase levels of saving and investment, and increase export 
growth by a minimum of 9 percent.70
ZIMPREST emphasized the need for strict fiscal responsibility, civil service and 
parastatals reform, and stakeholder participation in policy decisions.  However, these 
changes were never implemented.  Additional calls for democratization reform, good 
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governance, and the elimination of corruption were ignored.71  In response to rising 
unemployment, record inflation and interest rates, ever-increasing deficits, continued 
corruption, and mismanagement within the government, civil society organizations 
(CSOs) -- notably trade unions and veterans’ organizations -- began pressing for more 
transparent representation from their elected officials and demanding a greater voice in 
the political process.72
Table 4.3.  Strikes from 1991 to 2000 
  1996 saw the beginnings of mass strikes throughout the public 
sector culminating in 232 strikes in 1997, more than in any year since independence.  
Additionally, stay-aways and public protests showed the ability of organizations like the 
ZCTU and their Secretary General Morgan Tsvangirai to mobilize large groups against 
government policy and action.    
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Total 
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
1992 1 2 2 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 3 14 
1993 5 2 3 3 3 0 1 0 3 3 0 0 23 
1994 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1995 2 2 1 6 4 4 6 12 8 9 11 0 65 
1996 0 0 0 12 9 6 8 3 4 12 7 0 62 
1997 3 3 6 7 19 18 28 16 22 98 5 7 232 
1998 6 9 21 9 0 0 3 3 16 10 5 17 119 
1999 6 28 5 14 8 4 11 6 13 19 17 17 148 
2000 5 12 14 8 16 12 10 22 10 9 12 0 130 
Source: Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social 
Welfare, 2001. 
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To protest their absence from political involvement and the rising 
authoritarianism of ZANU-PF, labor movements, student and youth groups, women’s 
organizations, churches, business and lawyers’ groups, and NGOs formed the National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in May 1997.  Launched in January 199873, the NCA’s 
goal of “[S]triv[ing] to protect, promote, deepen and broaden the concepts and practice of 
democracy, transparency, good governance, justice and tolerance in the Republic of 
Zimbabwe”74 was part of a broader effort to forge an alternative political voice which 
stressed counter-hegemonic ideologies that incorporated a wide spectrum of business and 
social interests.  In addition to consolidating domestic support, the NCA also sought the 
support of international civil society organizations.75
In addition to human rights, militarism continued to play a central role in criticism 
over Mugabe’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998.  
 
Additional criticism came from independent human rights organizations, most 
notably the Catholic Church.  In March 1997, the Catholic Commission for Justice and 
Peace (CCJP) published their damning Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland & 
Midlands.  The report detailed the regional context behind ZANU-PF’s fear of subversion 
and the methods by which they quelled perceived resistance during their consolidation of 
power in the first decade of independence.    
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75 L.M. Sachikonye, “The Institutional Development of Unions in Zimbabwe,” in Striking Back: The Labor 
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Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the new Tutsi-dominated government, aided 
by Uganda and Eretria, decided to attack the Hutu army residing in the Congolese 
borderlands.  Zimbabwe, along with fellow South African states Namibia and Angola, 
sent troops to help support the Kabila regime due to the vast amount of mineral wealth 
possessed by the DRC and its potential membership in a Southern Africa economic 
consortium.76
Zimbabwe’s initial involvement in the DRC consisted of three thousand troops, 
combat aircraft, and armored vehicles.  This number would eventually reach eleven 
thousand with a daily operating cost of U.S. $1 million in 1998.  It is estimated that in all, 
Zimbabwe spent nearly U.S. $263 million in the DRC, with some claiming significantly 
higher totals.  As casualties and costs mounted, severe criticisms arose from the news 
media
  
Intervention in the DRC facilitated two key desires of Mugabe and Zimbabwe’s 
ruling elite.  First, the conflict led to high levels of profiteering by military and 
government officials through mining concessions, preferential trade, and the supply of 
arms, food, and goods.  Second, since the end of Apartheid, Mugabe desperately sought 
to regain the international prominence he once held as leader of Front Line States.  Upon 
gaining control of the defense arm of the South African Development Community 
(SADC) in 1996, Mugabe set out to assert his influence in regional conflict mediation.   
77
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 and CSOs and caused the IMF and Western lenders to question future 
investments.  Additionally, the Zimbabwean military itself was beginning to question 
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their presence in the DRC.  A report by the Standard in January 1999 claimed that 
twenty-three officers had been arrested in December 1998 for planning a coup against the 
government.78  Mugabe’s enraged reaction and the Central Intelligence Organization’s 
(CIO) prolonged detention and abusive interrogation of Standard editor Mark 
Chavunduka demonstrated the desperation of the government to quell any perceived 
dissent as well as their complete disregard for civil rights, the private media, and judicial 
process.79
By the end of the decade, Zimbabwe had successfully alienated itself from the 
majority of the international community.  Continued concerns over human rights and 
pervasive corruption lost Mugabe the support of Western governments while his blatant 
refusal to adhere to Word Bank and IMF conditions demanding a reduction in 
government payroll, relaxation of import controls, and streamlined regulations aiding the 
start-up of small and medium-sized businesses resulted in the loss of support from both 
organizations.
 
80
                                                 
78 “Senior Army Officers Arrested,” Zimbabwe Standard, January 10, 1999. 
79 Meredith, Mugabe: Power and Violence, 147-149. 
80 Geoff Hill, The Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown (Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2003), 89. 
  However, it would not be the cessation of international aide which 
would cause disastrous upheaval in Zimbabwe’s next decade of independence, but the 
dissention of war veterans of the Second Chimurenga, the men and women who Mugabe 
had built his support upon twenty-five years prior.        
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War Veterans and Shifting Power Dynamics 
 
No group reflected the deep disillusionment of Zimbabwe, or would have a more 
lasting impact on the relationship between the state and the governed, than the war 
veterans of the Second Chimurenga.   By the late 1990s veterans became central actors in 
the escalation of Zimbabwe’s economic and political deterioration due to their ability to 
transcend the constraints of authoritarianism and successfully challenge state power.   
By late 1997, veterans of Zimbabwe’s liberation war had become exceedingly 
frustrated over unfulfilled wartime promises for land and wealth redistribution.  
Ironically, the liberation war remained ZANU-PFs primary source of political legitimacy, 
with veterans representing a key constituency.  However, due to a lack of organization, 
veterans found themselves marginalized for over a decade and a half while Mugabe 
extolled revolutionary rhetoric for his own political gains.     
Beginning in March 1997, tensions reached a boiling point when the Zimbabwean 
government was forced to suspend payments from the War Victims’ Compensation Fund 
due to excessive corruption and theft.  After Mugabe continually dismissed their 
grievances, war veterans altered their tactics from negotiation to outright confrontation.  
Protestors harassed party officials and organized rallies in major cities, culminating on 
August 11th with a mass demonstration against ZANU-PF during Mugabe’s Heroes’ Day 
Speech.  To prevent a violent escalation, Mugabe agreed to resume payments and award 
gratuities to each of the fifty thousand veterans claiming compensation.  The estimated 
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total cost was an unbudgeted Z$4 billion that tripled currency devaluation to U.S. $30 
and brought about an economic crisis from which the country has yet to recover.   
 In addition to the economic fallout, Mugabe’s capitulation left the state 
vulnerable to a further devolution of authority.  Desire for a politically expedient 
resolution had significantly weakened Mugabe’s hold on power.  Specifically, the 
dynamic between the state and the governed had been inverted with the government 
finding itself at the mercy of those who had been longstanding instruments of ZANU-
PF’s political machine.  Now organized and motivated by success, the War Veterans’ 
Association (WVA) and their leader Chenjerai “Hitler” Hunzvi sought greater political 
gains by articulating the landlessness of many disenchanted Zimbabweans.  
As part of its agreement with the WVA a $50,000 gratuity, $2,000 tax-free 
monthly pension, and free healthcare and education would be provided to veterans and 
their families.81  Additionally, 20 percent of all those selected for resettlement were to be 
ex-combatants.82  Since land was one of the few commodities that could still effect mass 
political mobilization, in late 1997 ZANU-PF selected 1,471 commercial farms for 
compulsory acquisition and resettlement.  However, the careless nature in which lands 
were seized caused open contention within the courts.  Of the farms designated for 
resettlement, 625 were undesignated.  Land hungry veterans, incited by ZANU-PF’s false 
promises, began occupying rural areas between June and August 1998.83
                                                 
81 Cyril Zenda, “War vets now shameless mercenaries,” Zimbabwe Independent, June, 12 1998.   
82 Dashwood, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy, 103. 
83 Editorial, “Rural anarchy looms as government sits by,” Zimbabwe Independent, June 26, 1998. 
  In addition to 
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actual veterans, the WVA’s ranks began to grow with an influx of unemployed youths 
who found the veteran movement to be the only effective vehicle of advancement free 
from state intervention.  It was this contingent that carried out the majority of violent 
seizures in the following years.   
However, while war veterans represented the most aggressive threat to Mugabe’s 
power, it was the rise of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which 
constituted the greatest long term threat to ZANU-PF’s political hegemony.  Mugabe’s 
overriding fear of his waning popularity and MDC support would become the impetus for 
the final chapter in Zimbabwe’s decline into economic, social, and political chaos marked 
by violent land seizures and economic ruin.   
 
 
Opposition, Invasion, and Fast-Track Land Reform 
 
 By the late 1990s, Mugabe found himself at the center of an international storm 
due to Zimbabwe’s failing economy, questions over human rights, and their continued 
intervention in the DRC.  Additionally, threats from war veterans and CSOs, and strikes 
and demonstrations by organized labor confirmed that a large portion of Zimbabwe’s 
citizenry no longer supported ZANU-PF with the same fervor that had existed in the 
1980s.  Unfortunately, the lack of a viable opposition party left the majority of the 
population with a pessimistic apathy towards the future of political pluralism.  However, 
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in February 1999, in the wake of a withering economy and unchecked land seizures by 
war veterans and their supporters, the ZCTU approved the formation of the Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC).   
 The MDC’s primary objective was to be a viable political party that could 
successfully contest elections and give the public an alternative option to ZANU-PF.  
Officially launched in September of 1999 under the leadership of ex-ZCTU secretary 
general Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC entered the Zimbabwean political arena during a 
period of severe national discontent.  Much like the NCA, the MDC harnessed a broad 
spectrum of CSOs into a coalition with the overarching purpose of removing ZANU-PF 
and Mugabe from power.     
 Formation of the MDC coincided with another major turning point in the political 
and social transformation of Zimbabwe.  Beginning in early 1999, Mugabe appointed a 
constitutional reform commission aimed at replacing the 1979 Lancaster House 
Constitution and quelling pressure from the NCA for democratic reform. After over five 
thousand meetings, the four hundred person commission delivered a draft constitution to 
Mugabe in November 1999 that addressed many of the criticisms that had plagued the 
government since independence, notably human rights and freedom of the press.84
                                                 
84 Amnesty International, “Zimbabwe-Constitutional Reform – An Opportunity to Strengthen Human 
Rights Protection,” AI Index AFR46/01/00, January 2000, 2 
  
Additionally, it provided for a Prime Minister and removed the President’s power to 
appoint his thirty members to Parliament.  However, the constitution’s final draft was not 
a unanimous decision as twenty commission members found it a poor reflection of the 
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peoples’ will.  Notably, it allowed Mugabe to continue as President for an additional two 
terms.   
At its core, Zimbabwe’s constitutional referendum represented an open forum for 
post-independence grievances concerning abuses of power and the failing economy.  
NCA and MDC opposition sought to limit presidential and state power, and campaigned 
vigorously to thwart any attempt by ZANU-PF to prolong their reign by focusing on the 
country’s mass unemployment, increasing poverty, fuel shortages, corruption scandals, 
and intervention in the DRC.85
 However, in the face of NCA, MDC, and CSO opposition, the referendum failed 
in February 2000 57.4 percent to 45.3 percent, cementing the first political defeat for 
ZANU-PF and the first popular victory for the MDC.
  In a last-minute bid for votes, Mugabe added a clause 
allowing land seizures by the government without compensation, and demanded that 
Great Britain, as the former colonial power, provide compensation for seized land.  
86
“The constitutional referendum of February 2000 marked a watershed in Zimbabwean 
politics…The referendum defeat marked the moment when it became clear that the ruling 
party faced a major electoral challenge in the shape of the Movement for Democratic 
Change…It forced an immediate and dramatic shift in the strategies of ZANU-PF in 
which veterans and the land took center stage.”
  In the words of Jocelyn 
Alexander:  
 
87
As a result of the referendum’s failure, the political and social rhetoric of Mugabe 
and ZANU-PF took on a far more racially charged tone.  This new message cast white 
 
 
                                                 
85 Meredith, Mugabe, 164. 
86Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe, 24-25 June 
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Zimbabweans as unrepentant racists who represented the last vestiges of colonial 
occupation.  Veterans, once severe critics of the government, were recast as heroes of 
Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle who now existed to re-exert ZANU-PF’s influence in the 
rural regions it once dominated.   
 Beginning in late February 2000, veterans began what has been frequently called 
jambanja, a period of chaos and lawlessness.  A series of well-coordinated government-
sponsored invasions of white-owned farms left over thirty people dead (mostly MDC 
supporters) and countless more injured.  Known as the Third Chimurenga, the invasions 
represented a desperate attempt to reclaim the revolutionary essence that had defined 
Mugabe’s early successes.  Despite rulings that found the seizures to be illegal, the end of 
constitutional restrictions on acquisition payments left many without a legal leg to stand 
on.  Further eroding the court’s authority was the overt aid of government bodies like the 
CIO, who directed veteran operations and selected specific farms for invasion.      
 Ultimately, land occupations were designed to set the stage for a political 
campaign that played to ZANU-PF’s large constituency of communal farmers and 
simultaneously punished supporters of the opposition, namely white farmers and their 
labor force.88
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  As the parliamentary election of 2000 began, veterans became the militant 
wing of ZANU-PF, waging a campaign of intimidation and violence against the MDC 
and its supporters while Mugabe and ZANU-PF leaders vilified white farmers, painting 
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them as imperialist cronies.89
Table 4.4.  2000 National Assembly Election Results 
  Despite its best efforts, the judiciary was openly 
undermined and state-owned television and print media were utilized solely by ZANU-
PF.  In the end, ZANU-PF’s violent campaign resulted in a marginal victory that hinged 
primarily on the terror of rural populations.   
Party Votes % Votes Seats % Seats 
ZANU-PF 1,205,844 48.10 62 51.7 
MDC 1,171,167 46.72 57 47.5 
ZANU-Ndonga 15,766 0.63 1 0.8 
Other 114,186 4.55 0 0.0 
Total 2,506,973 100.0 120 100.0 
Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa,  
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zimresults2000p.htm (accessed June 1, 2009) 
  
Following ZANU-PF’s slim victory, the party intensified its use of jambanja to stamp out 
opposition support before the presidential elections in 2002.  In an effort to make the land 
a focal point over a woeful economy and human rights, veteran groups began a new 
phase of occupations commonly referred to as “Fast-Track” resettlement that employed 
two models, A1 and A2.  A1 resettlement focused on small-scale farms and villigisation 
similar to that which took place in the late 1980s.  A2 was intended for medium and large 
scale farms, specifically those which possessed the greatest resources.  While ZANU-PF 
claimed that Fast-Track resettlement would allow for personal self-sufficiency, a cadre of 
indigenous farmers, and black entrepreneurs, the truth remained that land facilitated little 
more than ZANU-PF’s retention of power.  Ultimately, Fast-Track resettlement’s greatest 
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flaw was that it paid little or no attention to infrastructure development and instead 
sought to resettle as many individuals as possible.90
Table 4.5.  Land Settlement Patterns Before and After Fast-Track Resettlement 
   
Date November 1997 November 2003 
Type Area (Millions 
Ha) 
Percentage Area (Millions 
Ha) 
Percentage 
A1 N/A N/A 4.2 10.6 
A2 N/A N/A 2.2 5.6 
Old Resettlement 
(1980-1997) 
3.6 9.1 3.7 9.3 
Communal 16.4 41.4 16.4 41.4 
Large Scale 
Commercial 
12.4 30.5 2.6 6.6 
National Parks and 
Urban 
1.4 3.5 1.4 3.5 
State Land 6.0 15.2 6.0 15.2 
Other N/A N/A 2.8 7.1 
Total 39.6 100.0 39.6 100.0 
Source: The Herald, October 26, 2003 and Medicine Massiwa, Land Reform Program in 
Zimbabwe: Disparity Between Policy Design and Implementation, Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Zimbabwe 
  
As white farmers and the CFU attempted to challenge the seizures in court, 
ZANU-PF and war veteran leaders chastised their attempts and threatened those civil 
servants who attempted to defend white clients.  Fast-Track reform’s chaotic nature led to 
a steep escalation of claims and complaints from organizations ranging from the MDC 
and CFU to the Indigenous Commercial Farmers Union (ICFU), General Agriculture and 
Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), and the Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
(ZFU).  However, little could stop Fast-Track reform, as it had ceased to be about wealth 
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redistribution and correcting the injustices of colonialism and instead facilitated little 
more than ZANU-PF’s political survival and land grabs among the elite.   
While Mugabe claimed that Fast-Track resettlement had ended as of August 2002, 
police seizures continued into the next year.  Damage caused to Zimbabwe’s 
infrastructure and economy was incalculable.  Underutilization of farms, unqualified 
personnel, mass unemployment, shortages of foreign currency, and severe food shortages 
compounded the international isolation, drought, and political upheaval that had defined 
the past five years.  Mining and manufacturing fell sharply and agricultural production 
crashed.  Ultimately, unchecked land redistribution was the final nail in Zimbabwe’s 
coffin, plunging the country into utter destitution. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MURAMBATSVINA AND THE AFTERMATH OF 
FAST-TRACK LAND REFORM 
 
 
Mugabe’s improbable victory in the 2002 presidential election over MDC leader 
Morgan Tsvangirai only cemented the belief among international lenders that Zimbabwe 
had fallen into autocracy and further investment constituted a wasted expenditure.91  
Refusal to permit international observers, gerrymandering of polling stations, and 
intimidation by the Zimbabwe Republican Police (ZRP)92 and youth militias caused the 
European Union, the United States, and the British Commonwealth to declare the 
elections unfair.93
 By 2004, over three million Zimbabweans (roughly one-quarter of the population) 
had fled to neighboring countries resulting in regional tensions and border disputes.  
Unemployment had reached 80 percent, 68 percent of the population lived below the 
  Mugabe simply responded with obstinance, and opposition supporters 
across the country were imprisoned, beaten, and murdered.  Tsvangirai himself was 
briefly imprisoned and charged with treason.  By 2003, Zimbabwe had ceased to have 
any defining characteristics of a transparent and stable democracy, instead reverting to 
tyrannical rule.    
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poverty line, and food was being used as a political tool.94
Table 5.1.  2005 House of Assembly Election Results 
  With the 2005 parliamentary 
elections approaching, few believed that the results would end in anything less than a 
victory for ZANU-PF.  However, in contrast to their previous electoral practices, ZANU-
PF utilized mass electoral fraud instead of widespread violence and intimidation.  Once 
the results had been tallied, predictions held true, but likely did not reflect the true voice 
of Zimbabwe’s citizenry.     
Party Votes % Vote Seats % Seats 
ZANU-PF 1,569,867 59.59 78 65.0 
MDC 1,041, 292 39.52 41 34.2 
Independents 16,878 0.64 1 0.8 
ZANU-Ndonga 6,608 0.25 0 0.0 
Total 2,634, 645 100.0 120 100.0 
Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 
 http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zimresults2005.htm (accessed June 1, 2009).  
 
 Despite a solid “victory” for ZANU-PF, an examination of regional election 
results shows that ZANU-PF’s support base still resided primarily within rural sectors, 
while MDC supporters came from urban centers.  In an act of retribution against MDC 
supporters, and under the pretense of urban renewal and crime prevention, Mugabe 
                                                 
94 Central Intelligence Agency, “Zimbabwe,” CIA World Factbook, 
http://www.credoreference.com/entry.do?id=7913467 (accessed June 9, 2009). 
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instituted the program of Murambatsvina95 on May 18, 2005. While official reasons 
claimed a need for the “eradication of chaos that currently prevails in the City,”96  The 
operation quickly escalated into “a deliberate nationwide campaign, destroying what the 
Government termed illegal vending sites, structures, other informal business premises 
and homes, literally displacing hundreds of thousands of people.”97
 In addition to the human toll, Murambatsvina caused further deterioration of 
Zimbabwe’s informal sector and continued harm to a country already facing severe 
budget deficits, triple-digit inflation, a chronic shortage of foreign currency, and 
desperate need for food and fuel.
  Consequently, an 
estimated five hundred thousand individuals were left homeless while nearly one hundred 
thousand were left without any source of income.  A lack of food, water, shelter, 
sanitation facilities, and medical care created a humanitarian emergency while church 
organizations, humanitarian aid agencies, and neighboring governments were 
overwhelmed by the flood of refugees flocking across Zimbabwe’s borders. 
98
                                                 
95 Murambatsvina is a Shona word meaning “drive out the rubbish.” 
96 “Transcript of Speech by the Chairperson of Harare Commission Cde Sekesai Makwavarara on the 
occasion of the official launch of “Operation Murambatsvina” at the Town House on 19th May, 2005 at 12 
noon,” The Herald, May 28, 2005.   
97 Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, United Nations Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe, 
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Murambatsvina,” 2005, 12.  
98 Ibid., 7. 
  In the words of the United Nations Special Envoy,  
“Operation Restore Order [Murambatsvina], while purporting to target illegal dwellings 
and structures and to clamp down on alleged illicit activities, was carried out in an 
indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering, and, in 
repeated cases, with disregard to several provisions of national and international legal 
frameworks.”  
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Simply put, Murambatsvina represented the desperation of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-
PF to maintain power, and was the final measure for their complete disregard for 
democratic institutions, rule of law, and human life.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has analyzed the political, economic, and social factors which directly 
led to Zimbabwe’s implementation of Fast-Track land reform and its consequent 
destruction of peace and prosperity.  Specifically, it maintains that while Fast-Track land 
reform was the significant catalyst propelling Zimbabwe’s decline to unforeseen levels, it 
was not the sole cause.   Throughout majority rule, Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF have 
steered a ship sinking under the weight of its colonial legacy, the ideals of Mugabe’s 
socialist vision, mismanagement and corruption at every level of government, and the 
crushing effects of economic liberalization.  Desire for political consolidation and one-
partyism resulted in the violent repression of human rights and condemnation by an 
international community that once held Mugabe in the highest regard.  Finally, the ever-
present specter of land has haunted Zimbabwe since its earliest colonial memories, been 
the deepest desire of the dispossessed masses, and the most powerful political tool 
available to a ruling elite facing severe questions of legitimacy.   
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Central to Zimbabwe’s decline was the loss of political pluralism after only seven 
years of majority rule.  ZANU-PF’s consolidation of power marked the end of a 
democratic culture necessary for political tolerance and the preservation of peace.  
Additionally, the methods by which Shona-centric ZANU-PF exerted its authority over 
Ndebele opposition supporters only deepened claims of ethnic favoritism and alienated 
important constituencies.  Finally, the contradictory nature of the resulting Unity 
Accords, which cemented power in the executive and weakened legislative oversight, 
only resulted in further divisiveness between the Zimbabwean government and civil 
society.      
 Additional strain came from worsening economic conditions.  While not 
comparable to the crippling levels of the following decade, by the late 1980s, 
Zimbabwe’s excessive spending on social programs, coupled with corruption and global 
economic decline, resulted in rising levels of indebtedness to international financial 
institutions (IFI’s).  Increased dependency on IFI’s and the need for additional loans 
necessitated Zimbabwe’s acceptance of the IMF and World Bank Economic Structural 
Adjustment Program in 1991.  While economic liberalization was intended to open doors 
for new business ventures while simultaneously weeding out poorly performing 
enterprises, ESAP instead resulted in rising unemployment, increased poverty, declining 
industrial output, and new opportunities for corrupt governance.   
 As a consequence of increased corruption by government officials, the failure of 
ESAP, a marginalization of civil society organizations, unrealized promises of land 
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resettlement, and their costly military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
ZANU-PF and Robert Mugabe had lost legitimacy with the Zimbabwean people.  
Successful strikes and demonstrations by labor unions and land seizures by veterans 
groups only emphasized the rising opposition against the government.  With the failure of 
Mugabe’s constitutional referendum -- a final attempt to prolong his term and once again 
popularize himself with the masses through revolutionary and racist rhetoric -- he was 
forced to utilize politically expedient methods to shift the national focus to a re-emergent 
land issue, the only piece of political currency available to him.  Land invasions by 
veteran groups and the consequent expulsion of white farmers led to a period of 
widespread violence and fear which allowed for ZANU-PF to maintain a slim majority in 
the National Assembly above the powerful opposition coalition Movement for 
Democratic Change. 
 Institution of Fast-Track resettlement the that same year represented the death 
knell of Zimbabwe’s social, economic, and political security.  Division and poor 
management of once prosperous farms left the agrarian base of Zimbabwe’s economy 
shattered and ruined.  Additionally, the complete lack of democratic stability, disregard 
for judicial authority, mass human rights violations, and economic destitution left IFI’s 
reluctant to offer any aid to the one-time breadbasket of Africa.   
At present, Zimbabwe is in the throes of a major humanitarian crisis. It has been 
beleaguered by ever increasing rates of HIV and AIDS, low population growth, acute 
food shortages, radically decreasing life expectancy, hyperinflation, and insecurity of life 
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and property.  Additionally, the growing brutality of political and electoral oppression has 
engendered significant domestic, regional, and international condemnation.  News media, 
human rights organizations, and foreign governments have all called for the end of 
Zimbabwe unchecked deterioration at the hands of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF. 
 While it has been less than thirty years since Zimbabwe gained its independence 
through a prolonged and bloody conflict, it stands as an example of how a nation’s 
colonial legacy, in concert with the realities of the international economic system, can 
result in the deterioration of peace and prosperity.  However, Zimbabwe’s unfulfilled 
promise speaks to not only to its own colonial legacy, but also the aftereffects of 
colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Racial tensions, in conjunction with the ever-present 
specter of land, created deep seeded distrust between the new majority government and 
colonial institutions necessary for economic, political, and social stability.  Additionally, 
the ideological conflict between Mugabe’s socialist vision and Western democratic 
principles resulted in a strained relationship between Zimbabwe and international lenders.  
Finally, IMF and World Bank structural adjustment represented the continued imposition 
of Western institutions on the developing world.  Ultimately, Zimbabwe illustrates the 
ability of failed governance, when left unchecked, to be intensified by international 
intervention, leading to the breakdown of social harmony.    
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